Several widely publicized incidents, in which passengers remained on an aircraft on the tarmac for up to 11 hours prompted the Department of Transportation (DOT) to issue a new rule designed to provide consumer protection to airline passengers. The rule mandates water/food/amenities for passengers on a plane for two hours, and an option to deplane after three hours. The rule also stipulates that airlines develop internal, auditable plans to meet the two/three hour clauses, and to report tarmac delays to the government for causal analysis.
Introduction
The DOT defines a "Tarmac Delay" as an event "holding passengers on a flight on the ground before taking off, or after landing, with no opportunity for its passengers to deplane" [1] . The definition identifies two hours as the threshold at which the passengers should be provided with food, water and lavatory service. The definition identifies three hours as the threshold at which the passengers should be allowed to deplane. In the last decade there have been several widely publicized incidents in which passengers were on flights for extended periods with degraded comfort including the absence of food and service amenities, and were unable to deplane.
Although the occurrence of these events is very, low [2, 3] the severity of the delay can be high. On a national level the highest incidence of tarmac delays was 0. In 2009 [4] , the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a rule specifically designed to protect airline passengers from excessive tarmac delays. The rule: (i) set thresholds for passengers rights of two hours for food, drink and amenities, and three hours for deplaning, (ii) requires airlines to develop contingency plans that can be audited by the DOT, (iii) requires airlines to assign personnel responsible for responding to customer complaints, (iv) mandates that the airlines report tarmac delays to the DOT (for post-operations analysis), and (v) enables the DOT to levy fines on the airlines using existing DOT financial penalty rules.
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The underlying philosophy of the rule is that by causal analysis (and incentive of avoiding fines), the stakeholders (i.e. airlines) will be able to make changes in operational procedures to eliminate the phenomenon. This approach does not take into account that this phenomenon is the result of the actions of distributed, autonomous, adaptive agents operating in large, complex networked system. First, the stakeholders may not have the information or authority to resolve the problem. Second, the phenomenon takes place in-the-tails of the distribution and likely is the result of large number of causes.
This paper describes a stakeholder analysis of flight operations in the NAS and identifies how the span of control, limits in information availability, and the division of responsibilities amongst the distributed, autonomous agents can result in "tarmac delays." An alternate "safety-net" approach is proposed that provides stakeholders with the authority, but without the information, a tool. The tool enables critical stakeholders to monitor and detect tarmac delays and take real-time mitigation actions. Candidate users of the tool include: staff at the Air Traffic Control System Command and Control Center, Airline Operations Centers, airline airport Station Managers, or third party assigned monitoring responsibilities. A prototype userinterface is shown in Figure 2 . This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a definition of "tarmac delays" and a summary of the statistics and history of tarmac delays. Section 3 provides an overview of the "tarmac delay" rules. Section 4 describes a stakeholder analysis.
Section 5 describes the requirements and the design of a web-based tool. Section 6 concludes with implications of this tool, the rule, and future work.
Tarmac Delays: A Brief History, Statistics, & DOT Rule
The DOT classifies situations in which were passengers on an aircraft parked on the tarmac with no means of deplaning for more than 2 hours as a "tarmac delay" [4] . The new DOT rule codified as Title 49, United States Code, 2009 was developed in response to a continuing occurrence of these events.
In January 1999 a Northwest Airlines flight from the Caribbean arrived in Detroit 22 hours late and then was kept on the tarmac for seven hours. Settlement of class action lawsuit of $7.1 million was reached between Northwest Airlines and the passengers stranded at Detroit during the snowstorm. Congress and the Clinton administration put in place some regulations but failed to pass legislative proposals including one that would require airlines to pay passengers kept waiting on a runway for more than two hours.
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In December 29, 2006 121 flights inbound to Dallas-Fort Worth were diverted to regional airports due to severe lightning and a tornado warning. Several flights were diverted to nearby Austin and remained on the tarmac at Austin for several hours. Two flights, American Airlines Flight 1424 (SJC-DFW) and Flight 1348 (SFO-DFW), stranded passengers for eight hours on the tarmac.
One month later, on a slow news day, February 14, 2007 (Valentine's Day), the media had a hey-day reporting on JetBlue's 12 flights had tarmac delays of over 3 hours (including one flight that held passengers for 11 hours) when a snowstorm curtailed operations at JFK. What did not receive as much media attention was nation-wide tarmac delays of 125 flights on that day including 10 Delta flights at JFK, 27 US Airway flights at Philadelphia, and 11 US Airways flights at Pittsburgh.
In response to these incidents the DOT Inspector General recommended that airlines be required to set a limit on the time passengers have to wait out travel delays grounded inside an airplane. The DOT proposed requiring airlines to have contingency plans for stranded passengers that would force the airlines to include contingency clauses in their "contract of carriage." A panel set up by the government of airline industry representatives considered the issue for 11 months before releasing a report in November 2008 that offered guidelines for what a model airline response plan should look like. Neither those guidelines nor the DOT proposed rule contained a specific limit on how long passengers can be kept waiting before being allowed to return to a gate.
During this period, 2005 to 2009, the frequency and severity of tarmac delays remained unchanged (Figure 1) . A study of "tarmac delays" at the three major New York airports yielded the following statistics [3] ;
• the probability of a flight experiencing a tarmac delay greater than 2 hours is 0.54% • the average delay experienced by the passengers that were delayed more than 2 hours, was 158 minutes with a maximum time of 435 minutes (more than 6 hours),
• June, July and August are the worst month for tarmac delays. Sixty four percent the tarmac delayed flights occurred in these months.
• flights outbound to Chicago O'Hare (8%) were the most likely to experience "tarmac delays,"
• An estimate of the average total cost to the airlines as a result of tarmac delay regulations at New York area is $43,859 per year or $476 per tarmac delayed flight. These results indicate that tarmac delays are a rare phenomenon, but when they do occur they can impact passengers in a significant manner. The costs of the delays can be absorbed by the airlines and do not provide sufficient incentive to modify airline schedules or build necessary capacity reservoirs to handle these operational situations. Air Carrier Responsibilities: The legislation calls for the Air Carrier to develop "Plans" to implement at a minimum the following:
• provide for the essential needs of passengers on board including: adequate food and potable water, adequate restroom facilities, cabin ventilation and comfortable cabin temperatures; and access to necessary medical treatment.
• submit a proposed contingency plan to the Secretary of Transportation that identifies J8-3 a clear time frame under which passengers would be permitted to deplane a delayed aircraft after 3 hours have elapsed. The option to deplane shall be offered to passengers at a minimum not less often than once during each successive 3-hour period that the plane remains on the ground. The right to deplane shall be waived if the pilot of such aircraft reasonably determines that the aircraft will depart or be unloaded at the terminal not later than 30 minutes after the 3 hour delay; or the pilot of such aircraft reasonably determines that permitting a passenger to deplane would jeopardize passenger safety or security.
These rules apply to flights that are diverted, or have returned to a gate following push-back.
Not later than 30 days after any flight experiences a tarmac delay lasting at least 3 hours, the air carrier responsible for such flight shall submit a written description of the incident and its resolution to the Aviation Consumer Protection Office of the Department of Transportation.
The plan shall be made available to consumers on the Internet Web site of the carrier or by other means.
Airport Responsibilities:
The legislation calls for Airports to develop "Plans" to implement at a minimum the following:
Airport Plans-Each airport operator shall submit a proposed contingency plan under that contains a description of: how the airport operator will provide for the deplanement of passengers following a long tarmac delay; and how, to the maximum extent practicable, the airport operator will provide for the sharing of facilities and make gates available at the airport for use by aircraft experiencing such delays.
Department of Transportation
Responsibilities: Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Transportation shall review the initial contingency plans submitted and approve plans that closely adhere to the standards.
The Secretary may assess a civil penalty under section 46301 against any air carrier or airport operator that does not submit, obtain approval of, or adhere to a contingency plan submitted under this section.
The Secretary of Transportation shall establish a consumer complaints hotline telephone number for the use of air passengers.
The DOT may appropriate funding to carry out this section, which sums shall remain available until expended.
Can this Rule Prevent Tarmac Delays?
The new DOT rule places full responsibility on the airlines to avoid "tarmac delays" by establishing contingency plans for all airline functions. The plans explicitly address what to do in the event of a tarmac delay. The rule also requires airlines to report the details of tarmac delay events for causal analysis and corrective actions.
Responsibility is also placed on the airports, in their role as "public utilities." to assist airlines and provide the necessary resources and infrastructure.
The rule does not take any steps to prevent the occurrence of tarmac delays through real-time monitoring and mitigation actions. The underlying assumption of the rule is that the tarmac delay phenomenon is a systemic failure that can be corrected. This approaches fails to recognize that the tarmac delay phenomenon:
(i) occurs in the tails of the flight delay distribution and is therefore not likely the result of normal operations with homogeneous causes
(ii) is the consequence of interactions between distributed, adaptive, autonomous agents operating in a complex network each with limited span-of-control, and limited access to information.
Whereas with enough time it may be possible to reduce the tails of the distribution through data collection and causal analysis, a simpler and faster approach may be to install a system to perform realtime monitoring of tarmac delays to identify and forecast individual flights that could end-up in a tarmac delays and to address those issues in realtime.
Stakeholder Analysis
This section provides an analysis of the stakeholders involved in the process of managing flights that end up with Tarmac Delays. Figure 3 provides an overview of the stakeholders involved in Tarmac Delays. Is not alerted to tarmac delay status of each flight.
Ramp Controller
Coordinates flights push-back/gate-in and ramp trajectories. No authority with regard to mitigating tarmac delays.
Has flight strips for all flights on taxiways. In good visibility has eyes out the tower cab.
Flight strips provide indication.
Ground Controller
Coordinates flight trajectories on airport taxiway system. No authority with regard to mitigating tarmac delays.
ATSCCC NOM Provides oversight of Traffic Management
Initiatives at the ATSCCC. Has more of a NAS-wide responsibility than the TFMU (see below). Responsibility for flights involved a TMI "program." Has authority to intercede on behalf of airline in negotiation with other airlines and TFMU.
Has detailed information of all flights in a TMI "program"
Is not alerted to tarmac delay status of each flight. Has knowledge of excessive departure queuing at airports.
ATSCCC TFMU Provides oversight of Traffic Management
Initiatives at the ATSCCC. Responsibility for flights involved a TMI "program." Has authority to prioritize flights within the scope of rules of TMI's.
Has detailed information of all flights in a TMI "program." May only be assigned a sub-set of airports.
Airport Management/Oper ations
Manage and operate the airport as a "public utility." Coordinate outsourced operations. Responsibility for emergency and abnormal operations. Has no authority with regard to tarmac delays. Under new DOT rule has some responsibility for providing resources and infrastructure to deplane passengers. Can support airlines, but not intervene in airlines operations.
No automation support. Has eyes and ears on the airport surface and contact with dispatch.
Is not alerted to tarmac delay status of each flight. May have knowledge of excessive departure queuing at airports.
Figure 3. Stakeholders and Their Reporting and Communication Channels
A flight involved in a tarmac delay involves the following stakeholders:
The flight-crew of the tarmac delayed flight are in voice and digital communication with the airline dispatch, ramp/ground control. The flight-readiness of the aircraft is determined by the flight-crew (with assistance from dispatch). Tarmac delays may be a flight-crew decision for "maintenance" reasons. For the flight to change position on the airport surface, move into the departure runway queue, or proceed to a gate, the flight-crew must get a "clearance" from ramp or ground control.
To approve of a flight departure or arrival, ramp/ground control are issued a "flight strip" for each flight that indicates that the flight is authorized to depart or proceed to a gate. Ramp and ground control are responsible for only the flights in their jurisdiction. They do not cause tarmac delays.
Although the controllers can see the flights from the tower window, this position does not include automation to keep track or detect tarmac delayed flights. There are no formal mechanisms for a controller to mitigate a tarmac delayed flight. When the request for clearance from the flight is received and is consistent with the information on the flight strip, the controller can authorize the movement of the flight.
The Air Traffic System Command and Control Center (ATSCC), located in a bunker near Washington D.C., manages the flow of flights in the NAS. When the forecast number of arrivals at an airport in a 15 minute time period exceeds the capacity of the arrival runways at the airport, the Traffic Flow Management Unit (TFMU) will activate a Ground Control Program and assign individual flights an Expected Departure Control Time (EDCT). This action will cause flights to remain on the ground in a tarmac delay. Likewise, if there is forecast over capacity in the airspace, TFMU will activate an Air Flow Program (AFP) or a Miles-In-Trail (MIT) restriction and hold flights on the ground at their origin airports.
Ground hold delays from GDP, AFP, and MIT do not generally exceed two hours, however there are no rules in the slot allocation scheme that prevent a flight being assigned an EDCT in excess of 2 hours. This is one of the causes of tarmac delays. In some cases a flight may have an EDCT that is less than two hours, but by the time the flight makes its way through the departure queue the flight may have exceeded the tarmac delay threshold. Some airports Another airline representative is the Station Manager and the gate and ground staff. This group is responsible for the gate-in, turn-around, and gate-out operations. For departing flights, once an aircraft is pushed-back from the gate, the gate resources are shifted to the next incoming flight or to other gates. None of these personnel have the explicit responsibility or the means to track and status flights on the tarmac. For arriving flights, Station managers coordinate gate assignment and supporting ground crew and equipment. Station managers have direct voice and data communication with dispatch.
Airport Management is a background activity associated with operating an airport. This activity mostly involves operating any facilities directory operated by the airport, and coordinating activities outsourced to supply-chain vendors. All airports have the authority and the procedures to deal with emergency and abnormal situations such as severe weather, accidents, terrorism, etc. The airport does not have the authority to interfere with airline operations.
The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) along with U.S. Immigration Services have responsibilities of security and passenger/cargo processing. These two enterprises are part of the critical path of the supply chain in providing resources for departing and arriving passengers.
"Gap" Analysis
The two scenario classes that yield Tarmac Delays, "forgotten flights" and "excessive curtailed capacity" have one feature in common: the stakeholders that have the authority to address the situation, are working the system at a more abstract level and do not have information on the status of these flights. The stakeholders that do have the knowledge, do not have the authority.
Despite the best efforts to improve operations to avoid Tarmac Delays based on the required DOT analysis reporting clause, the gap between knowledge and authority remains and can only be filled by system-wide information.
A Tarmac Delay Surveillance and Mitigation System (TDSMS) is required to monitor, detect and mitigate Tarmac Delays.
System Requirements and Design
The objective of the Tarmac Delays Surveillance and Mitigation is system is to provide decision support for detection and mitigation of "Tarmac Delays." Operators of the system include, but are not limited to: NOM at ATSCC, ATC Liasson Airline, Dispatchers/AOC "Super," Airline Station Manager and staff, and Airport Management/Operations. The specific functional requirements for each user of the tool are summarized in Appendix 1.
Functional Requirements

Performance Requirements
A five minute update rate of aircraft status is adequate of this purpose. Accuracy requirements should be sufficient to engender trust in the system. 
Input/Output Requirements
Technology Requirements
The tool should be available for access on (a secure) web-browser. This will provide for multiple location access and simplify configuration management and control.
Design Requirements
The following design requirements have been identified and implemented in a prototype. The system shall include three simultaneous displays ( Figure 5 ):
(1) a panel for a list of flights delayed on the tarmac for more than a specified threshold (e.g. 1 hour) for a specified set of airports.
(2) a panel for a geographic depiction of the airports in the NAS and current and forecast hotspots for tarmac delays, and 
Tarmac Delayed Flight List Panel
This panel includes a list of Tarmac Delayed flights. Flights are included on this list based on time spent on the tarmac after push-back and before liftoff, and after landing and before gate-in. Flights appear on the list when the Tarmac Delay exceeds a user-set threshold (e.g. 1 hour). Flights on the list are displayed a different color (e.g. orange) when the Tarmac Delay exceeds a user-set threshold (e.g. 2 hours). Flights on the list are displayed a different color (e.g. red) when the Tarmac Delay exceeds a user-set threshold (e.g. 3 hours).
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The parameters displayed for each flight in the list are configurable and set by the user. A default layout, illustrated in Figure 6 , includes the following parameters:
• Tarmac Each of the fields in the list can be selected resulting in ascending/descending ordering of the list by the contents of the field. Sequential ordering of fields can also be configured by the user.
Tarmac Delay "Hot Spots" Panel
This panel provides a view of the NAS. The display identifies Tarmac Delay "hotspots." The criteria for display and the colors can be configured by the user. In the default setting, an airport changes color to orange when the number of actual/forecast flights in a tarmac delay exceeds three. An airport changes color to red when the number of actual/forecast flights in a tarmac delay exceeds ten.
Selection of an airport on the graphic has two effects: (1) airport status information is displayed in the information panel, (2) only the flights at the selected airport are displayed in the flight list.
Status Information Panel
This panel provides information related to the status of the airport, status of the flight, or other status information. The information displayed in this panel can be configured by the user. For example Airport Status Information can be displayed.
Conclusions
The phenomenon of Tarmac Delays raises questions about the role of consumer protection, regulator responsibilities, stakeholder authority and system-wide information. Given that society designs, builds and operates large, complex adaptive systems: 1) Is it reasonable to expect non-normal event failures?
2) Can these failures be avoided by design?
3) Can these failures be legislated out of the system by mandate or by threat of fines? 4) If these failure cannot be avoided by design, is it reasonable to design an umbrella mechanism to detect and mitigate them? 5) What role does government as regulator of operations or consumer protection have in mitigating this situation?
Like all large, complex, systems composed of distributed and autonomous agents, the design and operations of the air transportation system and it's component air traffic control system inherently enables flights to experience tarmac delays. These delays can occur in two scenarios: (1) rare, but not unexpected events with reduced capacity requiring complex system-wide coordination, and (2) isolated events due to absence of protocol or breakdown in communications.
The first case is a rare, but not unexpected, event occurs (e.g. snowstorm) that requires system-wide coordination to reduce demand at key nodes to capacity (e.g. TFM programs). examples where the reduced capacity (i.e. gates) could not meet the demand. Some the steps taken to avoid this situation is better coordination to hold inbound flights at their origin airports to prevent overwhelming the limited resources and exacerbating the situation. Both the airlines and ATSCCC have roles in this change.
The other scenario is an isolated circumstance when coordination of the distributed parts of the system break-down and a flight is "forgotten." Examples of this scenario are the AAL 1348 flight at Austin and the Continental Express 2816 flight that required coordination between airline, airport, and U.S. Immigration.
In both cases, the stakeholders with the authority to address the situation were operating with "flow" information that does not reflect the tails of the distribution or individual flight information. Despite the best efforts to improve operations to avoid both of these scenarios, unless a change in the system information structure or a change in stakeholder authority is implemented the Even if the issues with authority and information could be addressed, given that the system is a large, complex system whose behavior is derived from the actions of distributed, autonomous, adaptive agents, can phenomena in-the-tails of the distribution, such as "tarmac delays" ever be eliminated through causal analysis alone. And is the speed of causal analysis, through a regulatory process, reasonable.
